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COMPULSORYJOINDER OF PARTIAL SUBROGEES:
IMPLICATIONS OF THE ALASKA RULE
I. INTRODUCTION
In Truckweld Equipment Co. v. Swenson Trucking & Excavating,
Inc., I the Alaska Supreme Court considered whether a defendant
could compel the joinder of a partial subrogee. 2 The court followed
the dictum in United States v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. 3 and cre-
ated a rule for the compulsory joinder of partial subrogees under
Alaska Rule of Civil Procedure 17(a).4
The purpose of this note is to scrutinize the Truckweld rule of
compulsory joinder. The first section of the note summarizes the
Truckweld case. The second section reviews the Truckweld opinion
and concludes that the court's reasoning is unconvincing. The third
section describes the dilemma presented by the Truckweld decision
and considers two potential responses. The dilemma is created when
lower courts are faced with an unenviable choice between certain
express procedures in the Alaska rules and the compulsory joinder
rule created by Truckweld The final section suggests a third, more
realistic response to this dilemma. The note concludes that while the
Copyright © 1984 by Alaska Law Review
1. 649 P.2d 234 (Alaska 1982).
2. See generally Recent Developments, Federal Jurisdiction and Practice: Is
Joinder of a Partial Subrogee Required, 33 OKLA. L. REv. 197 (1980); Annot., 13
A.L.R.3D 140 (1967).
3. 338 U.S. 366 (1949).
4. ALASKA R. Civ. P. 17.
(a) Real Party in Interest. Every action shall be prosecuted in the name
of the real party in interest. An executor, administrator, guardian, trustee
of an express trust, a party with whom or in whose name a contract has
been made for the benefit of another, or a party authorized by statute may
sue in his own name without joining with him the party for whose benefit
the action is brought; and when a statute of the state so provides, an action
for the use or benefit of another shall be brought in the name of the state.
No action shall be dismissed on the ground that it is not prosecuted in the
name of real party in interest until a reasonable time has been allowed
after objection for ratification of commencement of the action by, or join-
der or substitution of, the real party in interest; and such ratification, join-
der, or substitution shall have the same effect as if the action had been
commenced in the name of the real party in interest.
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Truckweld decision is an unfortunate reality, it can still be inter-
preted so that the explicit procedures of the rules are not rendered
useless. Thus, despite the clear implication of Truckweld to the con-
trary, procedures expressly set forth in Alaska's rules, especially the
procedure for ratification in Rule 17, should be retained.
II. A FACTUAL SUMMARY OF TRUCKWELD EQUIPMENT Co. v
SWENSON TRUCKING & EXCAVATING, INC.
The case originated with an action brought by Swenson Truck-
ing & Excavating, Inc. (Swenson) against Truckweld Equipment
Company (Truckweld) for negligently repairing a dump truck.
Swenson sought to recover the entire amount of its damages al-
though it had been reimbursed by its insurer, Insurance Company of
America (INA), for $12,000 of the $89,000 claimed in the suit.
Truckweld was granted summary judgment, but on appeal the case
was remanded for further proceedings on a single count of
negligence.5
Although INA initially considered representing its subrogated
interest separately at trial, it eventually agreed to be represented by
Swenson's attorney and to bear half of the attorney's fees and costs.
A pretrial motion by Truckweld to name INA as a real party in in-
terest under Alaska Rule of Civil Procedure 17(a)6 was denied and
the trial proceeded without INA as a named party.
At the second trial, Truckweld obtained a favorable verdict and
moved for an award of costs and attorney's fees against both INA
and Swenson. The trial court ruled that Swenson alone would be
held liable for costs and attorney's fees;7 INA was not liable because
it was not a named party. Truckweld cross-appealed, arguing that
INA was joinable under Rule 17(a) as a real party in interest and
was therefore jointly and severally liable for attorney's fees and
costs.8 When Swenson failed to answer, INA was granted leave to
fie an amicus curiae brief.9
The Alaska Supreme Court unanimously held that the joinder
of partial subrogees could be compelled under Rule 17(a).1o How-
ever, at trial Truckweld's motion for joinder had been untimely; con-
5. Swenson Trucking & Excavating, Inc. v. Truckweld Equip. Co., 604 P.2d
1113, 1120 (Alaska 1980).
6. 649 P.2d at 235. The trial court's denial of a later motion under Rule 17(a)
to dismiss for failure to name a real party in interest was not contested on appeal.
Id at 239.
7. See id at 235.
8. Id at 235-36.
9. Id at 236.
10. Id at 238.
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sequently, the lower court's denial ofjoinder was affirmed.1 1 Under
these circumstances, the court's discussion of joinder was unneces-
sary because the issue of timeliness was dispositive of the entire case.
Nevertheless, the court chose to announce a clear rule regarding the
compulsory joinder of partial subrogees.
III. AN EXAMINATION OF THE REASONING IN TRUCKWELD
In order to examine the Truckweld decision, it is important first
to determine whether the Alaska Supreme Court would have com-
pelled joinder under Rule 17 or under Rule 19.12 Joinder has previ-
ously been compelled under both rules. Although Rule 17 does not
explicitly require it, some courts automatically join every party that
qualifies as a real party in interest. 13 Under the more analytically
correct approach,14 however, even if a court decides that a party is a
real party in interest under Rule 17(a), joinder is still determined
under the procedures of Rule 19.15 Courts following the latter ap-
proach treat motions for joinder of real parties in interest under Rule
17(a) as motions for joinder Rule 19.15
A number of factors indicate that, had it reached the issue, the
court in Truckweld would have compelled joinder under Rule 17.
First, the motion appealed was a motion to join the insurer as a real
11. The motion was untimely because it was made 60 days after the deadline set
in the pretrial order. See id at 239.
12. Different inconsistencies arise depending upon which rule Truckweld used
to compel joinder. See infra text accompanying notes 60-73. For a number of rea-
sons, see infra text accompanying notes 17-20, this note takes the position that the
Truckweld court contemplated joinder under Rule 17. Nevertheless, this note's ulti-
mate conclusion - that ratification survives Truckweld as a procedure available to
partial subrogees - applies regardless of whether joinder was contemplated under
Rule 17 or Rule 19.
13. See City Stores Co. v. Lerner Shops, 410 F.2d 1010, 1015 (D.C. Cir. 1969);
Wattles v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 82 F.R.D. 446, 451 (D. Neb. 1979).
14. See White Hall Bldg. Corp. v. Profexray Div. of Litton Indus., 387 F. Supp.
1202, 1204 (E.D. Pa. 1974), a.f'd sub nom. Quaglia v. Profexray Div. of Litton In-
dus., 578 F.2d 1375 (3d Cir. 1978).
15. See, e.g., Jefferson v. Ametek, Inc., 86 F.R.D. 425, 429-30 (D. Md. 1980);
Whitcomb v. Ford Motor Co., 79 F.R.D. 244, 245 (M.D. Pa. 1978); Kint v. Terrain
King Corp., 79 F.R.D. 10, 11 (M.D. Pa. 1977); White Hall Bldg. Corp. v. Profexray
Div. of Litton Indus., 387 F. Supp. 1202, 1204 (E.D. Pa. 1974), affd sub nom.
Quaglia v. Profexray Div. of Litton Indus., 578 F.2d 1375 (3d Cir. 1978). See also 6
C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1543, at 646 &
n.59 (1971) ("[T]he question of who should or may be joined in the action must be
determined under Rule 19 and Rule 20 rather than Rule 17(a).").
16. See, e.g., Kint v. Terrain King Corp., 79 F.R.D. 10, 11 & n.2 (M.D. Pa.
1977); White Hall Bldg. Corp. v. Profexray Div. of Litton Indus., 387 F. Supp. 1202,
1204 (E.D. Pa. 1974), affl'dsub nom Quaglia v. Profexray Div. of Litton Indus., 578
F.2d 1375 (3d Cir. 1978).
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party in interest under Rule 17(a). 17 Nothing in the court's analysis
indicated that this motion was treated as one for joinder under Rule
19.18 Second, after stating that the policies behind Rule 19 did not
require joinder, the court switched its analysis to the policies alleg-
edly advanced by Rule 17.19 Indeed, the court ignored the condi-
tions for joinder set forth in Rule 19 and appeared to state that status
as a real party in interest under Rule 17(a) would automatically trig-
ger joinder.20
In creating a general rule for the compulsory joinder of partial
subrogees under Rule 17, Justice Matthews relied primarily on the
dictum in United States v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. 21 Aetna,
however, contemplated joinder under Rule 19(b). The United States
Supreme Court stated in Aetna that both an insured and its partially
subrogated insurer were "necessary" parties under Rule 19 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 22 Rule 19 and other federal rules
governing joinder were eventually revised in 1966. Despite these re-
visions, which were also incorporated into the Alaska rules, a signifi-
cant number of federal courts still follow the Aetna dictum.23
The Truckweld court acknowledged that the federal circuits are
split on whether to follow the Aetna dictum. 24 The circuits that re-
ject Aetna reason that the elimination of the categories of "neces-
sary" and "indispensable" parties by a 1966 amendment to Rule 1925
17. For example, the court's discussion of timeliness referred only to motions
under Rule 17. See Truckweld, 649 P.2d at 239.
18. Cf. cases cited supra note 16. The Truckweld opinion intimated that the
trial court may have regarded the Rule 17(a) motion as a motion to amend the
pleadings. 649 P.2d at 239. Nevertheless, whether the pleadings were to be
amended to include the insurer still depends on the criteria in Rule 17. Further-
more, the rule that allows motions to amend sets forth no criteria for joinder.
19. Truckweld, 649 P.2d at 239. By considering joinder under Rule 17 instead
of under Rule 19, the court hoped to avoid any inconsistency with the 1966 amend-
ment to Rule 19. But.4etna is also inconsistent with the 1966 amendment to Rule
17. See infra text accompanying notes 57-59.
20. See infra text accompanying note 48.
21. 338 U.S. 366 (1949).
22. Id at 381-82. Aetna considered whether an anti-assignment provision in the
Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) prevented subrogated insurers from bringing ac-
tions of their own against the United States. Id at 367-68. The Court held that the
anti-assignment provision exempted subrogations by operation of law. Id at 380.
The Court discussed joinder only after noting that FTCA suits brought by subrogees
would be subject to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
23. See cases cited infra note 28.
24. 649 P.2d at 236.
25. The version of Rule 19 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in effect at
the time Aetna was decided provided that:
(a) Necessary Joinder. Subject to the provisions of Rule 23 and of sub-
division (b) of this rule, persons having a joint interest shall be made par-
ties and be joined on the same side as plaintiffs or defendants. When a
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also eliminated the basis for theAetna dictum.26 Instead of automat-
ically joining partial subrogees, these circuits look for one of three
conditions that trigger joinder in the current version of Rule 19:
threats of multiple litigation, threats to the nonparty's interests, or
barriers to granting complete relief among the parties already before
the court.27 Under Rule 19, a court compels joinder only if one of
the enumerated conditions exists. Other circuits, however, continue
to follow Aetna without any meaningful discussion of the 1966
person who should join as a plaintiff refuses to do so, he may be made a
defendant or, in proper cases, an involuntary plaintiff.
(b) Effect of Failure to Join. When persons who are not indispensable,
but who ought to be parties if complete relief is to be accorded between
those already parties, have not been made parties and are subject to the
jurisdiction of the court as to both service of process and venue and can be
made parties without depriving the court of jurisdiction of the parties
before it, the court shall order them summoned to appear in the action.
The court in its discretion may proceed in the action without making such
persons parties, if its jurisdiction over them as to either service of process
or venue can be required only by their consent or voluntary appearance or
if, though they are subject to its jurisdiction, their joinder would deprive
the court of jurisdiction of the parties before it; but the judgment rendered
therein does not affect the rights or liabilities of absent persons.
FED. R. Civ. P. 19, 28 U.S.C. § 6100 (1964) (amended 1966). The current version of
the Rule, reflecting amendments adopted in 1966, provides:
Rule 19. Joinder of Persons Neededfor Just Adjudication.
(a) Persons to Be Joined If Feasible. A person who is subject to
service of process and whose joinder will not deprive the court of jurisdic-
tion over the subject matter of the action shall be joined as a party in the
action if (1) in his absence complete relief cannot be accorded among those
already parties, or (2) he claims an interest relating to the subject of the
action and is so situated that the disposition of the action in his absence
may (i) as a practical matter impair or impede his ability to protect that
interest or (ii) leave any of the persons already parties subject to a substan-
tial risk of incurring double, multiple, or otherwise inconsistent obligations
by reason of his claimed interest. If he has not been so joined, the court
shall order that he be made a party. If he should join as a plaintiff but
refuses to do so, he may be made a defendant, or, in a proper case, an
involuntary plaintiff. If the joined party objects to venue and his joinder
would render the venue of the action improper, he shall be dismissed from
the action.
FED. R. Civ. P. 19(a). The language of Rule 19 in the Alaska Rules of Civil Proce-
dure closely follows the language of the Federal Rule. Truckweld, 649 P.2d at 237
n. 1.
26. See Glacier Gen. Assurance Co. v. G. Gordon Symons Co., 631 F.2d 131,
134 (9th Cir. 1980); Dudley v. Smith, 504 F.2d 979, 983 & nn.4-5 (5th Cir. 1974). In
circuits where no appellate court has considered the issue, a number of the lower
courts have rejected the Aetna dictum. See, e.g., Kint v. Terrain King Corp., 79
F.R.D. 10, 11 n.3 (M.D. Pa. 1977); Prudential Lines, Inc. v. General Tire Int'l Co.,
74 F.R.D. 474, 475 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
27. See 3A J. MOORE & J. LUCAS, MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 19.07-.1[2]
(2d ed. 1982); 7 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 1604, at 35 (1972). See also infra note 74.
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amendment.2 8
The Truckweld court recognized that the 1966 amendment "ar-
guably eliminated the basis for the PAetna] dictum" and that the case
before it presented no risk of multiple suits.2 9 Nevertheless, the
Alaska court adopted the Aetna dictum and created a rule requiring
the joinder of partially subrogated insurers.30
Prior to Truckweld, courts following Aetna had usually ignored
the 1966 amendment to Rule 19.31 The Truckweld court, on the
other hand, analyzed both sides of the compulsory joinder issue,
adoptedAetna, and then attempted to justify its holding. The opin-
ion appears to be well-reasoned. A close analysis, however, reveals
that the Truckweld opinion is no more persuasive than the earlier
cases that wholly disregarded the 1966 amendment.
The court noted three discernible reasons for the adoption of
Aetna. First, the court stated that even when no threat of multiple
litigation exists, "[t]he policy against use or sham plaintiffs reflected
in Rule 17(a) remains unchanged. ' 32 Second, the court stated that
Alaska's broad provisions for costs and attorney's fees made it desir-
able that all interested parties appear before the court formally.
33
Third, the court concluded that compulsory joinder was
reasonable. 34
A. Policy Against Use Plaintiffs
Contrary to the view stated in Truckweld, no policy against use
plaintiffs exists in Rule 17.35 The original purpose of Rule 17 was to
create a method of pleading that allowed subrogees to sue directly.36
28. Truckweld, 649 P.2d at 237. See Virginia Elec. & Power Co. v. Westing-
house Elec. Corp., 485 F.2d 78, 85 (4th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 935 (1974);
Public Serv. Co. v. Black & Veatch, 467 F.2d 1143, 1144 (10th Cir. 1972).
29. See 649 P.2d at 238.
30. Moreover, the court was unimpressed "by abstract claims of prejudice re-
sulting from the jury's knowledge of partial coverage. Insurance is a widely ac-
cepted fact of life." Id at 238 n.4.
31. See Dudley v. Smith, 504 F.2d 979, 983 n.6 (5th Cir. 1974); Truckweld, 649
P.2d at 237.
32. 649 P.2d at 238. A "use plaintiff" is defined as "one for whose use (benefit)
an action is brought in the name of another." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1383 (5th
ed. 1979). Thus, Insurance Company of America (INA), at least to the extent it paid
amounts due under the insurance policy, was the use plaintiff for whose benefit
Swenson brought suit.
33. 649 P.2d at 238.
34. Id
35. See infra text accompanying notes 39-43.
36. Cf. Virginia Elec. & Power Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 485 F.2d 78,
84 (4th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 935 (1974); White Hall Bldg. Corp. v.
Profexray Div. of Litton Indus., 387 F. Supp. 1202, 1206 (E.D. Pa. 1974), a ffd sub
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Under the restrictive common law practice, subrogated rights were
only enforceable in the name of the subrogor for the benefit of the
subrogee.37 The current purpose of Rule 17 is stated in the advisory
committee notes to the 1966 amendment:
In its origin the rule concerning the real party in interest was per-
missive in purpose: it was designed to allow an assignee to sue in
his own name. That having been accomplished, the modem func-
tion of the rule in its negative aspect is simply to protect the de-
fendant against a subsequent action by the party actually entitled
to recover, and to insure generally that the judgment will have its
proper effect as res judicata.38
The amended version of Rule 17 contains a provision for ratifi-
cation that actually encourages the device of use plaintiffs. 39 A real
party in interest ratifies an action by promising to be bound by the
results of the litigation.40 In exchange for this legally enforceable
promise, Rule 17 allows the real party to forego participation in the
suit. Unlike joinder, ratification does not make the real party in in-
terest a named party to the suit.41 Thus, after an insurer ratifies a
suit, the suit continues with the insured essentially functioning as a
use plaintiff.
Ratification is inconsistent with the policy against use plaintiffs
which the court attributed to Rule 17(a).42 Even if such a policy
nom. Quaglia v. Profexray Div. of Litton Indus., 578 F.2d 1375 (3d Cir. 1978); Ward
v. Franklin Equip. Co., 50 F.R.D. 93, 94 (E.D. Va. 1970).
37. See Aetna, 338 U.S. at 381; 3A J. MOORE & J. LUCAS, MooRE's FEDERAL
PRACTICE 17.08, at 78 (2d ed. 1982); 6 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1541, at 633-34 (1971).
38. FED. R. Civ. P. 17 Advisory Committee notes to the 1966 amendment (em-
phasis added).
39. See ALASKA R. Civ. P. 17(a), set out at note 4 supra.
40. See, e.g., Urrutia Aviation Enters., Inc. v. B.B. Burson & Assocs., Inc., 406
F.2d 769, 770 (5th Cir. 1969); Motta v. Resource Shipping & Enters. Co., 499
F. Supp. 1365, 1371 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); James v. Nashville Bridge Co., 74 F.R.D. 595,
597 (D. Miss. 1977); Pace v. General Elec. Co., 55 F.R.D. 215, 219 (W.D. Pa. 1972);
Southern Nat'1 Bank v. Tri Fin. Corp., 317 F. Supp. 1173, 1188 (S.D. Tex. 1970),
affid in part on other grounds and vacated in part on other grounds, 458 F.2d 688 (5th
Cir. 1972).
A party typically ratifies by filing an affidavit with the court, see Sowash v.
Garrett, 630 P.2d 8, 12 n.3 (Alaska 1981), "explicit[ly] adopt[ing] the court proceed-
ings in question." Truckweld, 649 P.2d at 240 n.5.
41. See Hancotte v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 93 F.R.D. 845, 846 (E.D. Pa. 1982);
Clarkson Co. v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 441 F. Supp. 792, 797 (N.D. Cal. 1977);
Southern Nat'l Bank v. Tri Fin. Corp., 317 F. Supp. 1173, 1188 (S.D. Tex. 1970),
afl'din part on other grounds and vacated in part on other grounds, 458 F.2d 688 (5th
Cir. 1972).
42. Cf. Motta v. Resource Shipping & Enters. Co., 499 F. Supp. 1365, 1373
(S.D.N.Y. 1980). "Rule 17(a) ratification allows the parties freedom to determine
who shall prosecute a suit in which they both rightfully claim an interest. In the
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against use plaintiffs once existed,43 Rule 17(a) now recognizes the
legitimacy of use plaintiffs when the insurer ratifies the action. The
provision for ratification confirms that Rule 17's primary purpose is
to protect the defendant from further litigation, and not to abolish
the use plaintiff device.
B. Alaska's Costs and Attorney's Fees Policy
The Truckweld court also asserted that compulsory joinder fur-
thered Alaska's broad provisions for costs and attorney's fees.44
Alaska, however, could promote these policies without imposing
compulsory joinder by simply applying the procedures already pro-
vided for in Rule 17.4 5 As the Truckweld decision revealed, any
party ratifying under Rule 17 becomes jointly and severally respon-
sible for attorney's fees and costs.46 Therefore, compulsory joinder is
not the sole means to assure that all parties "bear the burdens as well
as the benefits of the litigation."47 Alaska's attorney's fees policy will
be protected whether the unnamed party ratifies or joins the action.
C. Reasonableness of Compulsory Joinder
The court's final rationale for adopting Aetna was simply that
compulsory joinder was reasonable:
If [the insured party] chooses to include the insurer's portion of
the claim along with its own, then we think it only reasonable that
the insurer also make an appearance .... Even if the insurer is
not actively participating, it stands to gain from the litigation,
since its share of any recovery will be impressed with a trust for its
benefit. Since its claim is being directly litigated, there is no rea-
son that it should not be made a named party.48
The court appeared to state that because the insurer was a real party
in interest there was no reason why it should not have been named to
the suit. The compulsory joinder of partially subrogated insurers,
absence of any prejudice to the defendant, this result is consistent with the underly-
ing rationale of the Rule ... ." Id
43. One commentator reports that an early predecessor of Rule 17 was based on
a notion that use plaintiffs were undesirable. Atkinson, The Real Party in Interest
Rule: A Pleafor itsAbolition, 32 N.Y.U. L. REv. 926, 936 (1957). References to the
use plaintiff rationale, however, are infrequent. See, e.g., 6 C. WRIGHT &
A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1541, at 635-36 & nn.9-11
(1971).
44. See ALASKA R. Civ. P. 54(d), 79 & 82.
45. Truckweld disrupts the explicit procedures of Rule 17 because it is inconsis-
tent with ratification under Rule 17(a). See infra notes 57-59 and accompanying
text.
46. See Truckweld, 649 P.2d at 239.
47. See id at 238.
48. Id
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however, is not reasonable because it subjects plaintiffs to the anti-
insurer prejudice of juries and produces unnecessary inconsistencies
within the Alaska rules.
1. Jury Prejudice. Compulsory joinder exposes both the in-
sured and its insurer to the anti-insurer prejudice of juries.
Truckweld asserts that insurance is a widely accepted fact of life and
that juries, even when not expressly informed of coverage, are never-
theless aware that insurance exists.49 Nevertheless, many courts still
refuse to join insurance companies because of potential jury
prejudice.5 0 The possibility of juror prejudice, therefore, remains a
cogent concern in many courts. Even some of the district courts that
follow Aetna have criticized the joinder of insurers because of the
possibility of prejudice.5 1
Little research has considered the prejudice of juries toward in-
surance companies.5 2 The research that does exist is inconclusive.
While one study evaluating the joinder of a plaintiff insurer con-
cluded that joinder actually benefited the insured plaintiff,53 most
studies have indicated that juries disfavor insurance companies.5 4
49. See Pace v. General Elec. Co., 55 F.R.D. 215, 218-19 (W.D. Pa. 1972). See
generally Comment, Evidence: Revealing the Existence of Defendantr Liability
Insurance to the Jury, 6 CUM. L. REV. 123, 137 (1975). At least one commentator,
however, notes that while modem jurors are likely to assume the defendant is cov-
ered by insurance, they are less likely to assume that an insurance company stands
behind the plaintiff. See Kennedy, Federal Rule 17(a): Will the Real Party in Inter-
est Please Stand4 51 MINN. L. REv. 675, 686 (1967).
50. See, e.g., Stouffer Corp. v. Dow Chem. Co., 88 F.R.D. 336, 338 (E.D. Pa.
1980); White Hall Bldg. Corp. v. Profexray Div. of Litton Indus., 387 F. Supp. 1202,
1206 (E.D. Pa. 1974), aft'dsub nom. Quaglia v. Profexray Div. of Litton Indus., 578
F.2d 1375 (3d Cir. 1978).
51. See Edwards, Inc. v. Arlen Realty & Dev. Corp., 466 F. Supp. 505, 513-14
(D.S.C. 1978) (criticizing Fourth Circuit rule); Public Serv. Co. v. Crane Co., 48
F.R.D. 424, 425 (N.D. Okla. 1969) (criticizing Tenth Circuit rule), a ffd sub nom.
Public Serv. Co. v. Black & Veatch, 467 F.2d 1143, 1144 (10th Cir. 1972).
At its worst, this prejudice that might result from the insurers' joinder
could result in complete denial of recovery to plaintiff and the insurers.
On a lesser level, this prejudice could result in a reduction of damages, in
which case the full effect of the prejudice would fall on the plaintiff alone,
since the insurers have first lien on any recovery obtained.
White Hall Bldg. Corp. v. Profexray Div. of Litton Indus., 387 F. Supp. 1202, 1206,
a2j'd sub nom. Quaglia v. Profexray Div. of Litton Indus., 578 F.2d 1375 (3d Cir.
1978).
52. See Martinez, Insurance: Discovery and Evidence, 1971 INS. L.J. 471, 485.
53. See Broeder, The Pro and Con of Interjecting PlaintifInsurance Companies
in Jury Trial Cases: An Isolated Jury Project Case Study, 6 NAT. RESOURCES J. 269,
276-83 (1966).
54. See, e.g., Broeder, The University of Chicago Jury Project, 38 NEB. L. REV.
744, 754 (1959); Comment, Admissibility of Evidence of Insurance in Automobile
Negligence Actions, 19 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 146, 148-49 & n.20 (1962).
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Jury prejudice may or may not exist. But if the threat of
prejudice has been deemed sufficient to restrict the mention of insur-
ance during trial,55 it should also be enough to prevent insurance
from being mentioned in the pleadings. Naming insurers to the ac-
tion may unfairly prejudice the plaintiff. The rules should be con-
strued so that juries are encouraged to focus on substantive issues
rather than on their own irrational biases.
5 6
2. Inconsistency With the Alaska Rules. The Truckweld deci-
sion, far from being a well-reasoned exercise in judicial rulemaking,
unnecessarily created substantial inconsistencies with the 1966
amendments to Rules 17 and 19. As a result of the 1966 amendment,
Rule 19 no longer contains language that can be interpreted as com-
pelling the joinder of partial subrogees merely because they are real
parties in interest.57 The Truckweld court attempted to remain faith-
ful to this amendment by shifting its analysis ofjoinder to Rule 17.58
But the inconsistency with the 1966 amendments is not avoided by
compelling joinder under Rule 17 instead of Rule 19. Since 1966,
Rule 17 has contained a procedure for ratification. Compulsory
joinder under Rule 17 is inconsistent with this procedure for ratifica-
tion.59 Truckweld, then, is unreasonable not only because it exposes
insured plaintiffs to jury prejudice, but also because it creates incon-
sistencies within the Alaska rules.
This inconsistency with the 1966 amendments could have been
avoided if the Truckweld court had proceeded directly to the case's
dispositive issue of timeliness. Instead, the court unnecessarily en-
dorsed the Aetna decision. The implications of Truckweld on
Alaska's current rules of procedure were left to be sorted out by the
lower courts. How the lower courts respond to the inconsistencies
created by Truckweld will determine whether ratification remains
available to partial subrogees.
IV. THE IMPLICATIONS OF TRUCKWELD
A dilemma arises when compulsory joinder is read into Rule
17(a), because that same rule also authorizes ratification. Lower
courts may feel uneasy when faced with a choice between the
Truckweld compulsory joinder requirement and the procedure for
55. See ALASKA R. EvID. 411.
56. In Edwards, Inc. v. Arlen Realty & Dev. Corp., 466 F. Supp. 505, 513
(D.S.C. 1978), the court noted that the forced joinder of an insurer has no objective
effect on the substantive claim, but that it could "quite possibly result in a verdict
not based on the substantive merits of the claim but rather on inherent prejudice
against insurance companies." Id
57. See generally supra note 25.
58. See Truckweld, 649 P.2d at 238.
59. See infra text accompanying notes 60-73.
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ratification expressly authorized by Rule 17. If ratification is al-
lowed, the rule in Truckweld is undermined because partial subro-
gees can avoid the compulsory joinder requirement by simply
ratifying the suit. If the Truckweld compulsory joinder requirement
is strictly enforced, the ratification procedure set forth explicitly in
Rule 17 must be disregarded. Unfortunately, the Truckweld decision
provides no guidance as to how this dilemma should be resolved. In
light of the supreme court's silence, lower courts are free to choose
among three possible responses to this dilemma.
A. Rejection of Ratification
The courts could choose to reject Rule 17's clearly expressed
provision for ratification and allow the requirement of compulsory
joinder created by the Truckweld dicta to prevail. Such a response is
inappropriate because it leaves Rule 17 in disarray and denies par-
tial subrogees the alternative of ratification.
There are a number of reasons why Truckweld should not be
interpreted to preempt Rule 17's provision for ratification. First, rat-
ification satisfies the policies that underlie the Truckweld decision.
The procedure protects the Alaska attorney's fees policy because any
party that ratifies becomes liable for fees. Furthermore, the court is
informed of "'the interest of the plaintiff, and . . . the interests of
* * .others in the claim' "o60 because the ratifying party files with the
court an affidavit indicating its interest.
In addition to advancing Truckweld's objectives, ratification is
"logical, just and effectu[ates] ...the purposes of [both] Rule 17
and Rule 19. ''61 The procedure promotes the rules' policies regard-
ing res judicata and the protection of defendants from subsequent
suits by the unnamed real party in interest. By uniformly rejecting
ratification, a court denies the parties their "freedom to determine
who shall prosecute a suit in which they both rightfully claim an
interest."'62 In short, neither Truckweld nor the Alaska rules suggests
a compelling reason to deny partial subrogees the option of
ratification.
Finally, ratification provides insurers and their insureds with
the only viable means of avoiding jury prejudice. The only other
techniques for avoiding jury prejudice, the "loan receipt" and the
60. Truckweld, 649 P.2d at 238 (quoting Aetna, 338 U.S. at 382). As a third
reason for adopting Aetna, the court cited a policy in Rule 17 against use plaintiffs.
No such policy exists. See supra notes 35-43 and accompanying text.
61. See Edwards, Inc. v. Arlen Realty & Dev. Corp., 466 F. Supp. 505, 514
(D.S.C. 1978).
62. Motta v. Resource Shipping & Enters. Co., 499 F. Supp. 1365, 1373
(S.D.N.Y. 1980).
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outright waiver of subrogation rights, are not likely to be feasible.
Although both of these methods allow the insurer to avoid all liabil-
ity for fees and costs, they present serious disadvantages that make
their utility doubtful.
The "loan receipt" is a common device for escaping joinder as a
real party in interest.63 Rather than pay for the loss, an insurer using
a loan receipt lends money to the insured. The loan is repayable
only to the extent the insured recovers against the parties who caused
the loss.6a Because the receipt provides for a loan rather than a pay-
ment, the insurer purportedly avoids subrogation to the insured's in-
terest.65 Most jurisdictions, however, treat the loan as a payment and
deem the insurer to be a real party in interest.66
Alaska courts, which have not yet ruled on the validity of loan
receipts, are unlikely to allow insurers this method to escape joinder.
The supreme court in Truckweld stated that parties should bear the
burdens as well as the benefits of having their claims litigaied in
Alaska's courts.67 Because the purpose of loan receipts is to avoid
liability for fees and costs, Alaska's courts will probably treat insur-
ers using such receipts as real parties in interest.
Another, albeit extreme, method of avoiding joinder is the in-
surance company's complete waiver of subrogation rights. An in-
surer might prefer to waive its rights when faced with an unlikely
recovery and potentially severe litigation expenses. At least one
court has recognized waiver as a valid method of escaping status as a
real party in interest.68 However, when an insurer waives its subro-
63. See generally Annot., 13 A.L.R.3D 42 (1967).
64. See Central Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Dixon, 93 Nev. 86, 87, 559 P.2d 1187, 1188
(1977); Atkinson, supra note 43, at 945.
65. See, e.g., United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Slifkin, 200 F. Supp. 563,
572-73 (N.D. Ala. 1961) (applying federal law); Miller v. Pine Bluff Hotel Co., 170
F. Supp. 552, 554 (E.D. Ark. 1959); American Chain & Cable Co. v. Brunson, 157
Ga. App. 833, 834, 278 S.E.2d 719, 721 (1981); Central Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Dixon, 93
Nev. 86, 88, 559 P.2d 1187, 1189 (1977).
66. Executive Jet Aviation, Inc. v. United States, 507 F.2d 508, 512-13 (6th Cir.
1974); City Stores Co. v. Lerner Shops, Inc., 410 F.2d 1010, 1014-15 (D.C. Cir.
1969); Condor Investment Co. v. Pacific Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 211 F. Supp. 671,
675-76 (D. Or. 1962).
67. 649 P.2d at 238.
68. In Johnston v. Timber Structures, Inc., 33 F.R.D. 25, 25-26 (E.D. Pa. 1963),
the court held:
It seems reasonable to conclude that an insurance company and its insured
can make a contract whereby the insurance company can cease to have
any interest in future legal action .... This claim belongs to the Home
Insurance Company who [sic] has seen fit to waive the right rather than
take the risk of a lawsuit with its attendant expense.
Therefore, we determine that the Home Insurance Company ... is
not a real party in interest.
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gation rights it entirely renounces its rights to share in the insured's
recovery of damages. As a consequence, insurers will rarely seek
waiver as a solution.
The importance of ratification is heightened by the fact that
there exists no viable alternative method to avoid joinder. Neither
"loan receipts" nor waiver fully protects insurers. The procedure of
ratification, however, effectively avoids jury prejudice. 69 Truckweld,
a decision which never expressly addressed the issue of whether
Aetna precluded ratification, should not be interpreted to deny in-
sureds and their insurers a procedure expressly authorized by the
Alaska rules.
B. Avoidance of the Dilemma: Viewing Truckweld
under Rule 19
A second response is that the courts could interpret Truckweld
as a case contemplating joinder under Rule 19. Although Truckweld
appeared to contemplate joinder under Rule 17, it may implicitly
have intended to compel joinder under Rule 19. Most courts which
adopt Aetna compel joinder under Rule 19, not Rule 17.70 These
courts hold that partial subrogees are "Persons to Be Joined if Feasi-
ble" under the current version of Rule 19(a).71
This interpretation of Truckweld as compelling joinder under
Rule 19 avoids the internal inconsistency that results when joinder is
required under Rule 17. Nevertheless, such a response presents an
inconsistency of its own by ignoring the express conditions that trig-
ger joinder under the substantive provisions of Rule 19(a). 72 Fur-
thermore, compelled joinder under Rule 19 still renders the
provision for ratification superfluous because ratification under Rule
69. Before the 1966 amendment, some courts followingAetna handled the prob-
lem of prejudice by not informing the jury that an insurance company owned a
portion of the plaintiff's claim. See Note, CivilProcedure - Insurance Companies as
RealParties in Interest, 46 Ky. L.J. 252, 259 (1958). Ratification achieves essentially
the same result.
70. See Garcia v. Hall, 624 F.2d 150, 152 (10th Cir. 1980); Virginia Elec. &
Power Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 485 F.2d 78, 85 (4th Cir. 1973), cert. denied,
415 U.S. 935 (1974).
71. See Virginia Elec. & Power Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 485 F.2d 79,
85, cert. denied, 415 U.S. 935 (1974). The "Persons to Be Joined if Feasible" lan-
guage appears in the heading to Rule 19(a). See supra note 25. The heading does
not appear to have been intended as a substantive provision because Rule 19 con-
templates joinder only if one of three conditions is triggered. See id
72. The Truckweld court appeared to be willing to accept this degree of incon-
sistency. See 649 P.2d at 238.
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17 would not prevent joinder from eventually being compelled
under Rule 19.73
It should be evident, then, that the compulsory joinder of partial
subrogees creates undesirable inconsistencies within the 1966
amendments. Compulsory joinder under either rule ignores the rati-
fication procedure that was added to Rule 17 in 1966. In addition,
compulsory joindei under Rule 19 ignores the express conditions for
joinder which were also added by a 1966 amendment. Truckweld,
however, can be interpreted so that the explicit procedures of the
rules are not rendered useless.
V. THE SUGGESTED RESPONSE: A RATIFICATION EXCEPTION
A third response to the dilemma allows the explicit procedures
of Rule 17 to take precedence over the Truckweld compulsory join-
der rule. A court adopting this approach would give a partially sub-
rogated real party the option of joining or ratifying the action. If
within a reasonable time the real party took no action, the court
would impose compulsory joinder pursuant to the Truckweld rule.
This suggested approach essentially creates an exception to
Truckweld" the court would not compel joinder when the real party
ratifies the action.
While under this approach the ratifying party will avoid com-
pulsory joinder under the Truckweld rule, it will not avoid joinder if
one of the three conditions under Rule 19(a) is triggered.74 This dis-
tinction between compulsory joinder under Truckweld and compul-
sory joinder under Rule 19 reflects the ultimate goal of the suggested
approach: to preserve, as completely as possible, the procedures ex-
plicitly set forth in the Alaska rules. Thus, if one of the three condi-
tions for joinder under Rule 19 is triggered, even a partial subrogee
that ratified would be joined in the action. But if none of Rule 19's
conditions is met, ratification would allow the action to proceed
without the partial subrogee's participation as a named party.
Admittedly, this exception to Truckweld entails a certain level
of inconsistency. For example, when a court imposes joinder under
the Truckweld rule, it still ignores Rule 19's three conditions for join-
73. See Edwards, Inc. v. Arlen Realty & Dev. Corp., 466 F. Supp. 505, 514
(D.S.C. 1978).
74. In Kint v. Terrain King Corp., 79 F.R.D. 10, 11 (M.D. Pa. 1977), the court
observed:
Rule 19(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides for the com-
pulsoryjoinder of a nonparty in three circumstances: (1) when the absence
of the nonparty precludes complete relief among the parties already pres-
ent; (2) when the nonparty will be unable to protect an interest he has in
the litigation; and (3) when the nonparty's interest in, but absence from,
the litigation subjects parties already in the action to a substantial risk of
multiple obligations.
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der. The ratification exception also presents a less than consistent
application of Truckweld itself. The rule that emerges from
Truckweld apparently requires the compulsory joinder of partial
subrogees in all cases. 75 The suggested approach, however, would
forego compulsory joinder whenever the real party ratified the
action.
Despite any inconsistency, this approach provides the most de-
sirable interpretation of Truckweld The suggested approach allows
partial subrogees to avail themselves of the ratification procedure set
forth in Rule 17.76 Moreover, unlike the other approaches, the ratifi-
cation exception applies regardless of whether the Truckweld court
intended to compel joinder under Rule 17 or Rule 19. Thus, the
question of whether partial subrogees can avail themselves of ratifi-
cation will not depend upon a technical inquiry as to which rule the
Truckweld court would have utilized to compel joinder. The sug-
gested approach directly addresses the dilemma and resolves it in
favor of prior Alaska case law and established rules of
interpretation.
A ratification exception to Truckweld best complies with the
prior Alaska case law. In KOS v. Williams, 77 the Alaska Supreme
Court indicated that real parties in interest are to be given a choice
between ratification and joinder under Rule 17.78 The approach
suggested above adopts the KOS rule: the partial subrogee, as a real
party in interest, is allowed to choose between ratification and join-
der. The other two approaches would have undercut KOS by im-
posing compulsory joinder whether or not the partial subrogee
ratified the action. The Truckweld opinion cited KOS with ap-
proval.79 Consequently, Alaska courts might prefer the inconsis-
75. There is language in Truckweld which may indicate that the Alaska court
will be satisfied by ratification as much as by joinder. Concerning the assessment of
attorney's fees and costs, the court indicated that ratification was the "functional
equivalent" of joinder. 649 P.2d at 239. But this passage of the opinion cannot be
taken to mean that ratification satisfied the requirements of compulsory joinder
under Aetna because the court was dealing with the narrow issue of Alaska's costs
and attorney's fees policy. Clearly, the court's adoption of the Aetna rule extends
much further. The court intended joinder to be compelled even when the issue of
costs and fees is absent.
76. The advantages of ratification have been discussed in the text accompanying
notes 60-69.
77. 616 P.2d 868 (Alaska 1980).
78. See id at 870; accord Montana ex rel Bohrer v. District Court, 171 Mont.
116, 118, 556 P.2d 899, 900 (1976). But see Southern Nat'l Bank v. Tri Fin. Corp.,
317 F. Supp. 1173, 1188 (S.D. Tex. 1970) (holding that the court, not the party,
determines whether the party ratifies or joins), affrd in part on other grounds and
vacated in part on other grounds, 458 F.2d 688 (5th Cir. 1972).
79. See 649 P.2d at 239.
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tency posed by a continued use of ratification to an undercutting of
the KOS rationale.
Additionally, an analogy can be drawn to the well-recognized
maxim of statutory interpretation that "repeals by implication are
not favored."' 0 Although the Truckweld compulsory joinder rule is
a creation of judicial interpretation rather than statutory enactment,
it should be interpreted to inflict the least possible damage to existing
procedures. The Truckweld court did not indicate whether its adop-
tion ofAetna precluded the use of ratification.8' Consequently, lower
courts should reject the implication that Truckweld repealed the use
of ratification by partial subrogees. Such drastic revision should oc-
cur only upon an express ruling by the supreme court.
Despite the implications of Truckweld to the contrary, partial
subrogees should be allowed the benefits of ratification. Such an ap-
proach advances the policies that concerned the court in
Truckweld,8 2 and provides a logical resolution of the Truckweld de-
cision consistent with Alaska case law and procedural rules. At least
one other court that has adopted Aetna has also allowed ratification.
In In re Wuttke,83 the court observed:
In the instant case it would appear that there are two real parties
- the plaintiffs and the insurance carrier. Pursuant to the Aetna
decision, the defendant can compel the joinder of [the insurer] or
its acquiescence in the lawsuit brought solely by the [insured]
To settle this matter. . . the Court will direct [the insurer] to
file with this Court ... a letter ratifying the conduct of this litiga-
tion .... 84
Although ratification may seem inconsistent with the rule in
7'ruckweld, this recent decision indicates that the two procedures can
meaningfully coexist. Under the ratification exception to Tnrckweld,
the basic force of the supreme court's decision remains in effect while
Alaska's procedure and prior case law suffer only minimal disrup-
tion. The suggested approach therefore constitutes the most reason-
able and useful interpretation of ruckweld
80. Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 549 (1974); Posadas v. National City
Bank, 296 U.S. 497, 503 (1936).
81. Aetna itself does not provide an answer to this question. When Aetna was
decided in 1949, the use of ratification was restricted to maritime proceedings. See 6
C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1555, at 709
(1971).
82. See supra text accompanying notes 60-61.
83. 2 Bankr. 362 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1980).
84. Id at 364.
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VI. CONCLUSION
In Truckweld the Alaska Supreme Court chose to engage in un-
necessary rulemaking. As a result, the issue of how compulsory join-
der affected the procedure for ratification never arose. Because the
court never addressed this issue, Truckweld should be interpreted to
enable partial subrogees to choose ratification as an alternative to
joinder. Such a result advances the policies that concerned the court
in Truckweld, permits insurers to escape the perceived threat of jury
prejudice, and allows the express language of the rules to control
Alaska procedure.
Steven D. Plissey
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